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Public Participation in Trade Negotiations:
Open Agreements, Openly Arrived At?
Brian J. Schoenborn
The separation of powers doctrine is a central tenet of de-
mocracy in the United States.1 As a consequence of power vest-
ing in separate branches of government, the legislative and
executive branches cooperate to carry out most governmental
functions, including the formation and administration of foreign
trade agreements. 2 Article I of the U.S. Constitution gives Con-
gress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations,
3
while Article II provides the executive with the power to negoti-
ate treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate4 and to
administer congressional initiatives. 5
1. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47, 57 (James Madison).
2. See DANIEL VERDIER, DEMOCRACY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: BRITAIN,
FRANCE, AND THE UNITED STATES, 1860-1990 (1994).
3. Congress shall have the power "[t]o regulate commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Additionally, the "necessary and proper clause" gives
Congress the power to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department
or Officer thereof." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See generally McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (holding that implied within the Con-
stitution is the power to do what is necessary and proper to carry out its terms).
Therefore, Congress may transfer its power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations to the executive, or to departments which Congress has previously es-
tablished within the executive.
4. The president "shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent
of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Under this arrangement, the executive is
charged with the duty of negotiating treaties and trade agreements which are
submitted to Congress for ratification. Trade agreements are a special type of
treaty concerned with tariffs placed on foreign goods imported into the United
States and on U.S. goods exported to foreign nations. See RAOUL BERGER, THE
PRESIDENTIAL MONOPOLY OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1, 33-37
(1972). Therefore, absent congressional intervention, the Constitution requires
that trade agreements be executed in the same manner as treaties.
5. The U.S. Constitution calls upon the president to "take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed." U.S. CONST. art II, § 3. Additionally, as the ad-
ministrative branch of government, the executive has the responsibility of as-
suring that the terms of those executed agreements are followed. This is
authorized by the United States Constitution which states that "the executive
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Conspicuously lacking in the international trade agreement
negotiation and implementation process, however, is an oppor-
tunity for consistent, meaningful public involvement. This is es-
pecially true in the negotiation process where the American
public is afforded few affirmative constitutional rights. One
right granted to the public is the opportunity to select their lead-
ers by way of election.6 When the public is apprised of govern-
ment activities, the collective force of public sentiment plays a
critical role in this selection process and places limits on the
reach of the government.7 Yet, international trade agreements,
with the notable exception of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA),8 have historically been negotiated and im-
plemented in relative obscurity, away from public scrutiny. For
the most part, this has left the public outside of the trade agree-
ment-making process.
This Note argues that increased public participation in in-
ternational trade negotiations should be encouraged. However,
while the United States values open government and individual-
ism, and citizen involvement is a requisite of democracy, partici-
pation must be limited to those methods best equipped to serve
U.S. public policy objectives. In the context of international
trade negotiations, the needs of government negotiators require
that limits be placed on public participation. These limits create
the confidentiality needed to negotiate effectively with foreign
nations.
Part I of this Note provides a historical background of public
participation in international trade negotiations. Part II dis-
cusses the importance of public participation in U.S. trade nego-
tiations and agreements. Part III details the current legal
structure of public involvement in international trade negotia-
Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." U.S.
CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
6. U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cl. 2; § 3, cl. 1; art. II, § 1, cl. 2. See generally
JOHN STUART MILL, LIBERTY OF THOUGHT AND DISCUSSION (1859) (discussing
the freedom of speech and the important role public sentiment plays in a
democracy).
7. See MILL, supra note 6.
8. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Mex.-Can.,
32 I.L.M. 289 and 32 I.L.M. 605 [hereinafter NAFTA]. NAFTA creates an eco-
nomic free trade area between the United States, Canada, and Mexico. NAFTA
was completed on September 6, 1992, and was signed on December 17, 1992, by
U.S. President Bush, Canadian President Mulroney, and Mexican President
Salinas. The agreement has been adopted by the government of each party.
See infra notes 70-77 and part II.C. (discussing why NAFTA was an exception
to the general practice that trade agreements are negotiated outside of public
scrutiny).
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tions and the different approaches to public participation. Part
IV examines potential changes to and the likely evolution of
public participation in international trade negotiations. This
Note concludes that formal-direct methods9 of public participa-
tion lead to more productive and efficient trade negotiations by
balancing the needs of the public with the requirements of gov-
ernment negotiators.
I. THE COURSE OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN U.S.
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
Historically, the American public participated only indi-
rectly in the trade negotiation process. Public involvement prin-
cipally centered on electing representatives who were
responsible for shaping U.S. trade policy.10 From the 18th cen-
tury until the 1930s, U.S. international trade relations" were
left to the interplay between these public delegates in the legis-
lative and executive branches and similar officials in foreign na-
tions.' 2 This trend first began to change with the Great
9. See infra notes 98-99, for examples of formal-direct methods of public
participation.
10. As delegates, elected representatives act on their constituents' behalf
in both foreign and domestic affairs. Interested private parties or organizations
meet with their elected officials to discuss U.S. foreign trade policy when cur-
rent issues pertain to their particular businesses. Typically, these occasions
arise when issues are "intermestic." Intermestic issues are those that effect
both domestic and international policies. JOHN W. SPANIER & ERIC M. Us-
LANER, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY MAKING AND THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMAS 28
(1994). Intermestic issues, such as trade and energy issues, attract increased
interest group representation, articulation, and influence. Id. Often "so many
groups have interests in the outcome of policies and see the stakes as so high
that these groups may control much of the policy process. Businesses, banks,
agriculture and shipping interests, and labor organizations have a natural in-
terest in trade, foreign investment, and tariff issues." Id.
11. For most of our nation's history, international trade relationships were
considered a relatively minor area of government activity. Generally, domestic
issues are more important than foreign issues to Americans because the public
considers those issues that most closely affect daily life to be most important to
them. According to the Gallup Poll, since the late 1960s, Americans have con-
sistently placed domestic issues far above foreign issues when considering the
most important problem facing the country. HAROLD W. STANLEY & RICHARD G.
NIEMI, VITAL STATISTICS ON AMERICAN POLITICS 164 (4th ed. 1994). In most
years after 1972, over 80% of those surveyed chose a domestic issue over a for-
eign one. Id. While international trade most certainly affects life in the broad
sense by creating new markets for goods and increasing the size of the economy,
many Americans do not see it as a pressing issue, central to the way in which
they live their lives. Id.
12. JOHN DAY LARKIN, TRADE AGREEMENTS: A STUDY IN DEMOCRATIC METH-
ODS 122-28 (1940). For example, the Fordney-McCumber Act of 1922, though it
delegated some congressional tariff-making powers to the president, still led to
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Depression and the enactment of the Trade Agreements Act of
1934.
A. TRADE AGREEMENTS ACT OF 1934
In 1934, Congress passed the Trade Agreements Act ("the
1934 Act"). 13 The 1934 Act gave the president the power to
enter into trade agreements with foreign nations to promote
U.S. interests at home and abroad 14 and, thus, was a radical
increased tariffs because the president found himself under too much congres-
sional scrutiny to act in the best interests of the nation. Id. at 3-4. Overall,
when considering international trade agreements, most members of Congress
may be divided into two groups: those who are protectionist at all times and
give interest groups whatever they need to retain their tariffs; and those who do
not, in principle, favor protectionism but feel they must not let their constitu-
ents down while a tariff bill is pending. Id. at 3. As a result, allowing legisla-
tive input into the process of enacting trade agreements led only to increased
tariffs with relatively few instances of tariff reductions. To avoid the evils of
logrolling and partisan politics, Congress enacted legislation establishing gen-
eral policies to be carried out by the administration. Id. This action was the
only way to lower tariffs "in the public interest without opening up a logrolling
orgy." Id. at 5.
13. Act of June 12, 1934, ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1351), as amended by Joint Resolution of March 1, 1937, ch. 24, 50 Stat. 24
(three-year extension); Joint Resolution of April 12, 1940, ch. 96, 54 Stat. 107
(three-year extension); Joint Resolution of June 7, 1943, ch. 118, 57 Stat. 125
(two-year extension); Act of July 5, 1945, ch. 269, § 1, 59 Stat. 410 (three-year
extension); Act of June 26, 1948, ch. 678, § 2, 62 Stat. 1053 (one-year extension);
Act of September 26, 1949, ch. 585, § 3, 63 Stat. 697 (three-year extension); Act
of June 15, 1951, ch. 141, § 2, 65 Stat. 72 (two-year extension); Act of August 7,
1953, ch. 348, Title I, § 101, 67 Stat. 472 (one-year extension); Act of July 1,
1954, ch. 445, § 1, 68 Stat. 360 (one-year extension); Act of June 21, 1955, ch.
169, § 2, 69 Stat. 162 (three-year extension); Act of August 20, 1958, Pub. L. No.
85-686, § 2, 72 Stat. 672 (four-year extension); Act of October 11, 1962, Pub. L.
No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 (five-year extension); Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
618, Title I, § 101, 88 Stat. 1978, 19 U.S.C. § 2111 (extended through January
1980); extended through the present by the Trade Act of 1974, § 102, as
amended by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. 96-39, Title XI, §§ 1101,
1106(c)(1), 93 Stat. 307, 311, 19 U.S.C. § 2112. The Act is currently cited as the
Trade Act of 1974. 19 U.S.C. § 2101 (1988).
14. 19 U.S.C. § 1351(a) (1934) (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1988)).
The 1934 Act's purposes include:
[E]xpanding foreign markets for the products of the United States (as a
means of assisting in the present emergency in restoring the American
standard of living, in overcoming domestic unemployment and the
present economic depression, in increasing the purchasing power of the
American public, and in establishing and maintaining a better rela-
tionship among various branches of American agriculture, industry,
mining, and commerce) by regulating the admission of foreign goods
into the United States in accordance with the characteristics and needs
of various branches of American population so that foreign markets
will be made available to those branches of American production which
require and are capable of developing such outlets by affording corre-
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change from pre-existing constitutional authority. 15 Prior to the
passage of the 1934 Act, trade agreements and treaties were cre-
ated in a similar manner. Both were negotiated by the executive
branch under the command of the president and sent to the Sen-
ate for advice and consent.16 When supported by two-thirds of
the Senate, trade agreements were sent back to the president to
be signed into law and delegated to an executive agency for
implementation. 17
The 1934 Act essentially removed Congress from the trade
agreements process. Congress granted the executive more au-
thority when negotiating with other nations by, in effect, trans-
ferring the Senate's traditional advice and consent power to the
president.18 The 1934 Act empowered the president to unilater-
sponding market opportunities for foreign products in the United
States.
Id.
15. Through the 1934 Act, Congress explicitly delegated broad implement-
ing authority to the president. 19 U.S.C. § 1351(a)(1-2) (1934) (current version
at 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1988)). Prior to the Act, the president had only negotiating
power and a limited ability to issue proclamations. See generally John H. Jack-
son, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Democratic
Law, 66 MICH. L. REV. 249, 283-84 (1967); S. REP. No. 258, 78th Cong., 1st Sess.
47, 48 (1943) (discussing the ramifications of the 1934 Act).
16. For a discussion of the president's power to enter into treaties and
trade agreements, see supra note 4.
17. Numerous executive departments and agencies are involved in the es-
tablishment and implementation of U.S. trade agreements and policy. The Of-
fice of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) is the most significant
agency on trade matters in the executive branch. JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM
J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 157 (2d ed.
1986). The USTR is charged with negotiating "with foreign nations on trade
and a number of other economic matters, and coordinates much of the United
States government policy formulation on such matters." Id.
Although not as influential in international trade as the USTR, the Depart-
ment of State is the principle U.S. department for foreign affairs, and as a re-
sult, the Department is very involved with international economic issues. The
Department's Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs focuses its attention on
international trade and policy. Id. at 158. In addition, the Department of the
Treasury directly controls the implementation of some of the key regulations of
international economic affairs. Id. The Department of Commerce has direct
implementing power over export control legislation and regulations and, since
1980, for countervailing and antidumping duties. Id. Congress delegated nu-
merous responsibilities relating to international trade in agricultural and com-
modity goods to the Department of Agriculture. Id. at 159. These
responsibilities include shipping food aid abroad, setting credit terms for the
exportation of American goods, and limiting the importation of food from U.S.
trading partners. Id. Many additional government departments and agencies
are active in the international trade process.
18. After the power to enter into trade agreements was concentrated in the
executive, American trade negotiators were able to coordinate the American
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ally "enter into foreign trade agreements with foreign govern-
ments or instrumentalities" and to proclaim and modify duties
and trade restrictions. 19 As an economic stimulus, the 1934 Act
also authorized the president to attack economic stagnation by
reducing tariffs on foreign goods by as much as fifty percent. 20
When the president took such an action, America's trading part-
ners reciprocated by reducing tariffs placed on U.S. goods,
thereby stimulating the U.S. economy. 21 Faced with the Great
Depression and the subsequent deterioration of the global econ-
omy, the 1934 Act called for a single, strong voice to deal effec-
tively with foreign nations. 22 Thus, the president, with this
congressional mandate, assumed the position of chief American
trade negotiator with complete and unrestricted authority to
enter into binding international trade agreements.
The 1934 Act also created the first formal method of public
participation in the international trade negotiation process.
Section 4 of the 1934 Act required "reasonable public notice" of
the president's intention to enter into agreements with foreign
states.23 This gave American citizens the opportunity to know
viewpoint and in turn bargain more effectively with foreign nations. See
LARKiN, supra note 12, at 22-32.
19. 19 U.S.C. § 1351(a) (1934) (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1988)).
20. 19 U.S.C. § 1351(a)(2) (1934) (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1351
(1988)) ("No proclamation shall be made increasing or decreasing by more than
50 per centum any existing rate of duty or transferring any article between the
dutiable and free lists").
21. From 1934 to 1939, the reciprocal trade agreements stimulated the do-
mestic economy enormously. WALTER LAFEBER, THE AMERICAN AGE 356 (1989).
U.S. exports rose by nearly one billion dollars and the U.S. favorable trade im-
balance increased from one-half billion dollars to one billion dollars. Id.
22. Professors Paterson, Clifford, and Hagen agree that:
The depression raised havoc with the international economy. Eco-
nomic nationalism guided most countries as they tried to protect them-
selves from the cataclysm with higher tariffs, import quotas, and
preferential and discriminatory trade agreements. World trade de-
clined 40 percent in value and 25 percent in volume from 1929 to mid-
1933. In 1933 the United States exported goods worth $2.1 billion,
down from the 1929 figure of $5.4 billion.
THoMAs G. PATERSON ET AL., AMERICAN FoREIGN POLICY 313 (1991). In 1934,
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, persuaded by Secretary of State Cordell Hull
that lowered tariffs would increase American foreign trade and spark a recov-
ery at home, called for the passage of legislation to effectively attack the rising
tariffs. Id. Hull, the chief proponent of the Trade Agreements Act of 1934, be-
lieved that "international commerce is not only calculated to aid materially in
the restoration of prosperity everywhere, but it is the greatest civilizer and
peacemaker in the experience of the human race." Id.
23. As codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1354 (1934), the 1934 Act provided:
Before any foreign trade agreement is concluded with any foreign gov-
ernment or instrumentality thereof under the provisions of Part III of
[Vol. 4:103
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with which foreign nations the U.S. government proposed to ne-
gotiate. The 1934 Act failed, however, to insure formal public
notice concerning the substance of agreements, 24 thereby re-
stricting any significant public participation regarding the sub-
ject matter of pending agreements. 25
this title, reasonable public notice of the intention to negotiate an
agreement with such government or instrumentality shall be given in
order that any interested person may have an opportunity to present
his views to the President, or to such agency as the President may des-
ignate, under such rules and regulations as the President may pre-
scribe; and before concluding such agreement the President shall seek
information and advice with respect thereto from the United States
Tariff Commission, the Departments of State, Agriculture, and Com-
merce and from such other sources as he may deem appropriate.
19 U.S.C. § 1354 (1934) (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1354 (1988)).
24. The notice provision in § 4 of the Act, as codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1354
(1934), is limited to giving public input to the president or designated agency
head concerning conflicts over whether a specific country would make a good
trading partner. The Act does not provide for public notice on the specific issues
being negotiated or provisions of an agreement. See id.
Pursuant to the Act, the president established the Trade Agreements Com-
mittee which was composed of high ranking members of the executive branch.
LARKiN, supra note 12, at 48-58. The Trade Agreements Committee, commonly
known as the Committee for Reciprocity Information, conducted public hear-
ings at which specific items up for negotiation with a particular country would
be discussed. Interested parties were required to conform to a series of proce-
dures when requesting to participate. Id. at 75-79. The Committee, however,
made no assurances and could revert back to the simple § 4 notice at any time.
Id. at 67.
25. Overall, the president had the power to keep the doors of the trade pro-
cess closed, giving the public a false sense of involvement. See 19 U.S.C. § 1354
(1934) (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1354 (1988)). While some executive-initi-
ated public participation procedures were established, see supra note 23 and
accompanying text, consistent public involvement was still lacking.
By concentrating both negotiation and ratification power in the executive,
the 1934 Act did streamline the trade agreement process. Trade agreements no
longer needed to conform to the treaty ratification process established in the
Constitution. See supra note 4. The executive could both negotiate and execute
trade agreements. 19 U.S.C. § 1351(a)(1-2) (1934) (current version at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1351 (1988)). In case the executive moves outside the scope of Congress' in-
tent, the 1934 Act provides two contingency arrangements to allow for reasser-
tion of congressional authority. First, Congress retained its control over the
actual transfer of power by requiring the 1934 Act's reauthorization on a peri-
odic basis, typically every three or four years. 19 U.S.C. § 1352(c) (1934) (cur-
rent version at 19 U.S.C. § 1352 (1988)); see also supra note 13 (listing the
various reauthorizations of the Trade Agreements Act). Failure to reauthorize
automatically stripped the executive of the congressional transfer of power,
causing the trade agreements process to revert back to the pre-1934 Senate
advice and consent procedure.
Second, Congress required all specific trade agreements implemented
under the 1934 Act to be automatically terminated, renegotiated or
reauthorized after being in existence no longer than three years from the en-
forcement date of the agreement. 19 U.S.C. § 1352(b) (1934) (current version at
1995]
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The 1934 Act not only was ineffective in its attempt to in-
crease public participation, but actually reduced public aware-
ness and involvement by eliminating the role of Congress-the
federal government branch most closely aligned with the people.
While the 1934 Act was in force, Congress was left almost com-
pletely outside the trade negotiation process, leaving most
agreements to be concluded and implemented in relative obscu-
rity, away from the critical eye of Congress and the public.26
With members of Congress no longer confronted by pending for-
eign trade agreements, Congress' attention and that of the pub-
lic turned more toward pressing domestic issues.27
The 1934 Act proved to be one in a series of congressional
enactments used to lead the country out of economic depres-
sion.28 As a result of the delegation of authority by Congress to
19 U.S.C. § 1352(b) (1988)). This clause provided Congress an important check
on the terms of specific agreements. By creating the Act with an agreements
termination clause, Congress may reassert itself on any issue or agreement
within three years (plus six months notice to the other country involved) of its
creation under presidential authority established under the Act. Id.
26. Consider, for example, the following observation by John W. Spanier
and Eric M. Uslaner:
Americans... are poorly informed and uninterested in foreign policy
issues. Their knowledge and experience, like that of most senators and
representatives, relate to affairs nearer home, such as family and pro-
fessional life; the political opinions they do hold are more likely to be
about national politics .... In general, it would be more accurate to
say that public opinion on foreign policy is a response to the policy
makers' decisions and to public presentation of the issues.
SPANIER & USLANER, supra note 10, at 28. By passing the Act, Congress dele-
gated its power to make trade agreements to the president and those agencies
within the executive branch charged with negotiating international trade
agreements. Therefore, except for the reauthorization sections (§ 1352(b) & (c))
and the public notice section (§ 1354), Congress and its constituents were re-
moved from the creation and implementation of reciprocal trade agreements.
See 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1988)).
As noted in supra note 1, under the separation of powers system estab-
lished under the United States Constitution, Congress provides a vital check on
the executive and judicial branches of government. That function is diminished
when Congress makes broad delegations of power to another branch. On trade
issues, the president may execute agreements which are within the broad limits
of a congressional delegation of power. See VERDIER, supra note 2, at 36-47.
27. See infra notes 33-38; M. MARGARET CONWAY, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
IN THE UNITED STATES 81-92 (2d ed. 1991). With Congress turning away from
trade agreements and the press following Congress' lead, the executive was left
to negotiate and implement trade agreements in relative secrecy. As long as
the executive maintained and controlled its negotiations with other countries,
information was kept within the executive branch.
28. Congress supported many of President Roosevelt's New Deal programs.
The Supreme Court supported the New Deal programs as well, with the excep-
tion of portions of the National Recovery Act struck down in U.S. v. Butler, 297
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the president, the public kept its distance from international is-
sues in general and international trade issues in particular. In
the post-Depression era, domestic issues became even more im-
portant to the general public and its representatives. 29 The em-
phasis on domestic problems, the tension between the executive
and legislative branches of government when addressing domes-
tic issues, and the 1934 Act, combined to leave the nation with
unity and consensus on international issues. 30 For the most
U.S. 1 (1936). These Acts, like the Social Security Act and National Labor Rela-
tions Act, created unprecedented levels of government involvement in the eve-
ryday lives of Americans. THEODORE J. Lowi & BENJAMIN GINSBERG, AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT: FREEDOM AND POWER 225-29 (3d ed. 1994). Yet these programs
apparently failed to pull the country out of economic depression. With the
Trade Agreements Act of 1934, the President resorted to the traditional eco-
nomic stimulus, increased free trade.
Under the act, the administration could bargain with other govern-
ments for a reciprocal lowering of tariffs without the need of congres-
sional approval for each agreement since Congress had given blanket
approval beforehand. By making concessions on foreign imports, the
government could persuade other countries to reduce their duties on
American goods. Actually, the concessions the United States made,
not the lower foreign duties, expanded American exports. For in a
world short of dollars, the purchase of American exports depended
largely on the number of dollars made available to foreigners.
ALEXANDER DECONDE, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 564 (1971).
Globally, between 1934 and 1945, twenty-nine [Trade Act] treaties
were made that reduced the U.S. tariff by nearly three-quarters. In
the five years following the first act in 1934, U.S. exports rose more
than $1.0 billion, and the nation's favorable trade balance ... soared
from $0.5 billion to nearly twice that amount.
LAFEBER, supra note 21, at 356.
29. In his first inaugural address in 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt
announced that "our international trade relations, though vastly important,
are, in point of time and necessity secondary to the establishment of a sound
national economy. I favor as a practical policy the putting of first things first."
DECONDE, supra note 28, at 562.
30. As explained by Professors Spanier and Uslaner:
Most legislators remain primarily concerned with domestic policies-
and with their reelection campaigns. Most foreign policy questions are
not salient to voters, so members of Congress tend to downplay their
importance and devote their time to issues and services that are more
rewarding. Thus, only a minority of legislators are strongly concerned
about foreign policy and even they tend to be supportive of the presi-
dent in crisis situations.
SPANIER & USLANER, supra note 10, at 27.
During this period, the typical conflict between the separate powers in the
federal government was not present with regard to foreign policy issues.
The Congress has been traditionally supportive of the president in for-
eign policy. Legislators to a large extent felt a lack of familiarity and
sense of incompetence on foreign affairs. Viewing them as esoteric
matters beyond their personal experience, in contrast to farm or labor
problems, confronted with expert civilian and military witnesses at
committee hearings, they usually have tended to subordinate their
1995]
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part, Congress and the public remained disinterested in interna-
tional issues until the 1970s.
B. TRADE ACT OF 1974
The Trade Act of 1974 ("the 1974 Act") was a product of the
changing times in America. Continued Cold War maneuver-
ing31 and the lingering Vietnam War 32 made international rela-
tions increasingly more important to the general welfare of the
United States.33 By the mid-1970s, America's post-World War
II economic dominance began to deteriorate. 34 Led by Japan,
Asia began gaining economic strength, quickly joining Europe as
own presumed expertise-political judgmeht of the feasibility and ac-
ceptability of administration policies-to that of the president and his
phalanx of bureaucratic help.
Id.
31. The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union led to a
unification of foreign policy power behind presidential initiatives. Many com-
mentators call this period the Cold War consensus. JEREL A. RoSATI, THE POLI-
TICS OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 375 (1993). As Rosati states:
The cold war years led to the development of an ideological and foreign
policy consensus throughout American society and government, an ex-
traordinary time in American history. This consensual view fostered
the rise of presidential power, the expansion of the foreign policy bu-
reaucracy, the development of an acquiescent Congress, and the rise of
a national security ethos and free market ethos throughout govern-
ment and society.
Id.
32. Professors Spanier and Uslaner believe that:
[S]ince Vietnam, Congress has become more assertive and less willing
to accept presidential dominance on foreign policy. There has been a
renewed concern for the establishment of a balance of power between
the president and Congress in policy making, although this reassertion
of congressional power does not mean the legislature has become an
equal partner with the president.
SPANIER & USLANER, supra note 10, at 27. Overall, "[t]he reassertion of con-
gressional authority in foreign policy occurred for a number of complementary
reasons, most of which had to do with the Vietnam War." ROSATI, supra note
31, at 296.
33. According to the Gallup Poll, for a period during the height of the Viet-
nam War, Americans considered international issues more important than do-
mestic issues. STANLEY & NIEMI, supra note 11, at 164. Finally, after intense
media coverage of the quagmire in Southeast Asia, Congress reasserted itself in
the international arena by passing the War Powers Act. War Powers Resolu-
tion, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973). The Act limited the president's
power to send troops abroad, effectively ending the longstanding American for-
eign policy consensus.
34. According to the Economic Report of the President, 1975 was the last
year the United States experienced a merchandise trade surplus (i.e., the value
of exports was greater than the value of imports). STANLEY & NIEMI, supra note
11, at 370. Moreover, in 1974 and 1975, America's gross domestic and national
products declined as the nation suffered a recession. Id. at 417.
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a major global industrial competitor to the United States.35 At
the same time, increased media coverage brought international
trade issues to the public's attention3 6 and motivated individu-
als and groups to challenge the traditions, institutions, and au-
thority of government with respect to trade issues.37 The 1974
Act and its amendments, combined with increased public criti-
cism and demand for open government, contributed to a rekin-
dled awareness of government activities and their impact on the
public.38
Under the same swell of public activism that spurred the
reclamation of its war powers,3 9 Congress reanalyzed its trans-
fer of power on international trade issues. In 1974, after multi-
ple extensions of the Trade Agreements Act of 1934, creating
forty years of continuous presidential authority over interna-
tional trade matters,40 Congress passed a revised version of the
35. Professor Rosati has posited that:
As a consequence of [the economic recovery and rise of Western Europe
and Japan], it has become more difficult for great powers to success-
fully exercise influence abroad, especially through the use of force, and
economic issues have climbed to the top of the global agenda ....
Although the European and Japanese economies were destroyed by
[World War II], it was only a matter of time before economic recovery
took place, given their technological know-how and previous level of
economic development .... The growth of economic pluralism and in-
terdependence made it more difficult for the United States to success-
fully pursue its foreign economic policy abroad and promote economic
prosperity at home. The U.S. economy, in other words, became in-
creasingly dependent upon and affected by forces beyond its borders.
ROSATI, supra note 31, at 575-76.
36. One issue that raised public awareness with regard to international
trade was the oil embargo of 1973. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) agreed on reduced production levels that increased world
prices. This action was taken in retaliation for the U.S. support of Israel in the
Arab-Israeli War. As a result of America's dependence on Middle-Eastern oil,
prices skyrocketed and long lines at the gas pump led to a wave of economic
insecurity across America. See generally IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, THE CASE FOR
THE ARAB OIL EMBARGO (1975) (discussing the history and politics surrounding
the 1973 Arab oil embargo).
37. See generally V.O. KEY, JR., PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
500, 524-31 (1961) (discussing the prominent place occupied by pressure groups
in American politics as a result of the official government deference to public
participation, freedom of speech, and freedom of association).
38. Watergate lead to increased public criticism of government activity in
the 1970s and to increased public and congressional involvement in executive
activities. CoNwAY, supra note 27, at 11. This is exemplified by legislation such
as the War Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973), and the Trade
Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2101-2487 (Supp. V 1975) (current version at 19 U.S.C.
§ 2101-2487 (1988)).
39. See supra note 33.
40. See supra note 13.
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1934 Act.41 The 1974 Act provided for increased levels of public
involvement in international trade negotiations, 42 moving far
beyond the 1934 Act's required notice of a proposed trading
partner.
First, the 1974 Act required international agreements to in-
clude provisions creating domestic procedures through which in-
terested public parties could participate in the international
trade process.43 Second, the 1974 Act required the president to
seek information and advice from both private and public sec-
tors.44 Toward that end, it incorporated the use of advisory com-
mittees and included spontaneous opportunities for acceptance
of information from the public.45 Thus, the 1974 Act, supple-
mented by several amendments passed in 1979 and 1988,46
opened the door for unprecedented formal and direct public par-
ticipation 47  in the negotiation of international trade
agreements.
C. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In the latter half of the 1980s, government leaders and
trade experts once again began advocating reduced barriers to
trade as an answer to economic difficulty. The idea of increasing
the size and strength of the national economy by reducing the
restrictions on foreign trade became the driving force behind
41. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2101-2487 (Supp. V 1975) (current ver-
sion at 19 U.S.C. § 2101-2487 (1988)). With regard to the Act of 1974, Profes-
sors Jackson and Davey have stated that "[i]n many ways, the struggle of
Congress to regain some authority over international economic affairs was best
manifested in the passage of the 1974 Trade Act...." JACKSON & DAVEY, supra
note 17, at 77.
42. 19 U.S.C. § 2155 (Supp. V 1975) (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 2155
(1988)).
43. Id.
44. The president must seek information and advice on negotiating objec-
tives, bargaining positions, the operation of a trade agreement once entered
into, and other matters arising in connection with the development, implemen-
tation, and administration of U.S. trade policy. 19 U.S.C. § 2155(a).
45. Id. § (a)-(c).
46. The 1974 Act was amended by Pub. L. No. 96-39, title XI, § 1103, 93
Stat. 308 (effective July 26, 1979) and by Pub. L. No. 100-418, title I, § 1631,
102 Stat. 1264 (effective Aug. 23, 1988).
47. See supra note 44. Additionally, § 2155 of the 1974 Act created the Ad-
visory Council for Trade Policy and Negotiations (ACTPN). That group was
established as a permanent group to provide constant policy advice on matters
such as negotiating objectives, bargaining positions, and the operation of trade
agreements. 19 U.S.C. § 2155.
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trade agreements such as NAFTA.48 Ultimately, many govern-
ment leaders and trade experts became convinced that an in-
creased emphasis on free global trade was the key to future
economic prosperity.49
In the 1990s, the changing nature of world politics and eco-
nomics focused international issues on economic well-being
rather than political and military supremacy. Fearing environ-
mental destruction and increased unemployment, members of
Congress, commentators, and special interest groups have used
trade agreements such as NAFTA and the mass media to in-
crease public awareness and participation in international trade
relationships. 50 Congress has also amended its fast-track legis-
lation 5 ' to balance the public's call for openness against the gov-
ernment's need for confidentiality.
48. As a result of a similar economic climate which, during the Great De-
pression, spurred the passage of the 1934 Act, the Reagan and Bush Adminis-
trations initiated the concept of reducing barriers to trade between Mexico,
Canada, and the United States in order to increase the economies of all three
nations involved. President Clinton supported and Congress passed the North
American Free Trade Agreement in December 1993.
49. Professor Stuart S. Malawer of George Mason University has stated
that "international trade is the issue of the 1990s .... International trade in
this decade will determine the success or failure of millions of people and the
future of nations-their economic development and their political freedom."
Advice on Weathering the Trade Policy Storm, THE RECORDER, Mar. 4, 1993, at
13.
50. James 0. Goldsborough notes that the public is becoming more en-
gaged in U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War period. "The idea is that for-
eign and domestic policy are becoming one, and that presidents no longer can
treat foreign policy as their own privileged-and private-domain." James 0.
Goldsborough, Whose View? Despite Heightened Public Interest in Foreign Pol-
icy, the President Must Prevail, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRn., Jun. 14, 1993, at B5.
Goldsborough also states that the public will continue to demand a stronger
voice in international affairs. See id.
In an era of free trade with Mexico, fair trade with Japan and environ-
mental treaties that attempt to preserve the earth for future genera-
tions, foreign policy has achieved a domestic content it has not had
before. There is nothing 'foreign' about such issues. They have a direct
impact on the quality of life of individuals.
Id.
51. 19 U.S.C. § 2191 (1975), amended by Pub. L. 100-418, title I,
§ 1107(b)(1), 102 Stat. 1135 (1988) and Pub. L. 101-382, title I, § 132(b)(2), 104
Stat. 645 (Supp. III 1991). Fast-track gives the executive the freedom and cred-
ibility to negotiate effective trade agreements while it gives Congress the ability
to vote them down if it believes the pacts are not in the best interests of the
United States. The fast-track process prohibits amendments by Congress, forc-
ing a yes or no vote on the issue. Id. § (d). This gives negotiators more credibil-
ity when asserting that they represent the view of their country and may
negotiate on its behalf. See infra notes 161-68 and accompanying text.
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The events of the 1990s have led the American public to re-
alize that international trade issues have a direct impact on
their standard of living and way of life.5 2 The debate now fo-
cuses on whether the current methods of public participation are
more destructive than constructive with regard to the negotia-
tion and implementation of international trade agreements.
Before choosing a proper form of public participation, however,
it is necessary to examine its importance in the trade negotia-
tion process.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
Public participation affects international trade negotiations
in two distinct ways.5 3 First, public involvement serves as a
check on the power of elected and bureaucratic leaders by gener-
ating and limiting the issues which require government action.
Second, public participation provides those in positions of power
and influence with specific, detailed information upon which to
base their decisions. Without public input, government officials
risk making decisions based on incomplete information, thereby
compromising public policy.
A. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AS A CHECK ON GOVERNMENT
POWER
The U.S. Constitution establishes treaties as the supreme
law of the land.5 4 For the most part, provisions of treaties and
trade agreements supersede existing national, state, and local
laws concerning issues such as the environment, public health,
52. "[N]ow, for the first time, ordinary Americans are beginning to discover
that national and international trade decisions have critical relevance to their
daily lives. And as they increasingly seek a greater voice.., the trading game
will never again be the same." Charles Lewis, The Treaty No One Could Read:
How Lobbyists and Business Quietly Forged NAFTA, WASH. POST, June 27,
1993, at C1.
53. It is important to note that a specific due process right of participation
does not apply in global trade negotiations. Trade barriers do not carry with
them a property interest for those being assisted by them. The ideas of due
process notice and opportunity to be heard, provided by the U.S. Constitution's
5th and 14th amendments, are only available when an individual has been
granted an affirmative right by government to a thing that government is now
resolved to take away. See Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) and Bi-
Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Colo., 239 U.S. 441
(1915).
54. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
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safety, welfare, and worker rights.55 Without access to the in-
ternational trade agreement negotiation process, U.S. citizens
do not have access to instruments which may adversely affect
their standard of living. Public participation thus provides an
important check on government action in such critical areas.
The checks and balances provided by the separation of pow-
ers are fundamental to the U.S. Constitution.56 Unfortunately,
when Congress delegates its power to another branch of govern-
ment, the network of checks and balances is disrupted. Under
the Trade Agreements Act of 1934, for instance, the executive
had complete authority over trade agreements. Such absolute
presidential authority, without congressional or judicial over-
sight, creates the potential for abuse.57
In trade negotiations, the public acts as an important check
on government power, filling gaps and pressuring government
leaders to act in accordance with public opinion. As early as the
Revolutionary War and its slogan of "no taxation without repre-
sentation,"58 the values of those who established the United
States were evident. If persons are not afforded an opportunity
to influence the creation of laws, they should not be forced to live
under them. 59 For the same reason, public participation in in-
ternational trade agreements is important to the maintenance of
America's system of democracy.
55. E.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature
Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5, 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter
GATT).
56. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 48, 51 (James Madison).
57. The Constitution, in charging the executive with ensuring that the
laws are faithfully executed, see supra note 5, provides for delegations of power
by Congress to the executive. When examining the intent of the Founders, how-
ever, it is unlikely that delegating all power with respect to an issue as impor-
tant as international trade to a single branch of government was contemplated
during the drafting and debates surrounding the "Faithfully Executed" clause.
See supra note 1.
58. In March of 1765, the British Parliament passed the Stamp Act; the
first tax on the Colonies. While the purpose of the Act was the legitimate one of
meeting part of the cost of the British military establishment in America, the
resulting tax was opposed by nearly everyone. An official stamp was required
on nearly all paper, from newspapers to playing cards. This action was no mere
matter of the control of external commerce but of internal taxation. Hence the
sentiment: "No taxation without representation." That sentiment became one
of the hallmarks of the American Revolution. DuMAs MALONE, THE STORY OF
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 41-46 (1954).
59. See id.
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B. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AS AN INFORMATION SOURCE
Only for the past fifty years has the U.S. government real-
ized the importance of the public as an information source which
is needed to make fully informed decisions. In 1946, the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act (APA)60 was established to provide deci-
sion-makers in government agencies with adequate information
upon which to establish national policy.6 1 By providing the pub-
lic a role in the decision-making process, the APA indirectly
codified two notions central to a democracy and public participa-
tion: first, rational treatment of its citizens by government is
critical; second, a government must be accountable for its
actions.62
Rational treatment of the people by their government is im-
portant for two reasons. First, "[ilt anticipates a governmental
determination based on correct factual predicate; in other words,
a decision making process that is likely to be effective in getting
at the truth."63 The truth is determined through the input of
those with relevant information and those who will be affected
by the decision. Second, "it requires a tenable connection be-
tween facts and the government action taken under the applica-
ble legal standard."64 The testimony and involvement of
individuals affected by the proposed decision ensures that such a
connection exists. These elements are critical checks on the ar-
bitrary imposition of rules and regulations by the government.
Accountability in government is also important. Accounta-
bility differs from rational treatment in that accountability em-
phasizes protecting individual rights while rational treatment
emphasizes the importance of "good government." 65 Here, ac-
60. The APA established numerous avenues for the public to participate in
administrative proceedings being conducted by the federal government. See
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, §§ 701-06 (1988). For in-
stance, § 553 creates a procedure whereby interested members of the public
may request an opportunity to submit their perspective in writing or testify in
person to the agency making the rule. 5 U.S.C. § 553.
61. See generally FINAL REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, AT THE REQUEST OF THE PRESIDENT, TO INVESTI-
GATE THE NEED FOR PROCEDURAL REFORM IN VARIOUS ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBU-
NALS AND TO SUGGEST IMPROVEMENTS THEREIN, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1941) (discussing the reasons behind the need for the APA and avenues
for public participation).
62. See Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Relationship Between Fun-
damental Values and Procedural Safeguards in Constitutional Right to Hearing
Cases, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 301, 302-04 (1979).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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countability means "some sense of assurance that decisions are
being reached in an impartial and rational fashion; that is, that
a disinterested observer could examine the administrative rec-
ord and determine that the agency is acting consistently with its
legal mandate."6 6 Therefore, accountability ensures that gov-
ernment activity has not extended beyond what is justified by
the enabling legislation, or more generally, beyond the system of
government within which the activities take place.
There are costs, of course, in allowing the public to partici-
pate in facilitating rational treatment and accountability in gov-
ernment activities, initiatives, and programs. 67 Providing
access to government, whether through hearings or advisory
committees, requires sacrificing individual and government time
and resources. 68 The needs of the public, however, are at the
heart of public policy and demand that the public be involved
and consulted, especially when other built-in checks are compro-
mised by the delegation of power. As Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. wrote:
The very considerations which judges most rarely mention, and al-
ways with an apology, are the secret root from which the law draws all
the juices of life. I mean, of course, considerations of what is expedient
for the community concerned. Every important principle which is de-
veloped by litigation is in fact and at the bottom the result of more or
less definitely understood views of public policy; most generally, to be
sure, under our practice and traditions, the unconscious result of in-
stinctive preferences and inarticulate convictions, but nonetheless
traceable to the views of public policy in the last analysis.
6 9
Despite the costs associated with public participation, recent
trade agreements, such as NAFTA, demonstrate that such costs
are outweighed by the benefits.
C. THE NAFTA EXAMPLE
The importance of public participation as both a check on
governmental action and a source of information was demon-
strated in the recent public debate surrounding NAFTA. 70
66. Id.
67. Two obvious costs are the financial requirements and time delays sur-
rounding providing the public with opportunities for participating in govern-
ment policy-making.
68. See Rabin, supra note 62.
69. OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 35-36 (1936).
70. See supra note 8. NAFTA "is a process by which Mexico, the United
States, and Canada have agreed to surrender their control and sovereignty over
certain limited aspects of their trade policy . . . in order to achieve the benefits
that are available from mutual relaxation of protectionism and the cementing of
this resolve in the form of an international agreement." STEVEN GLOBERMAN &
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Many families perceived that their livelihoods would be
threatened by pro-NAFTA employers3 1 Some believed that
NAFTA would encourage U.S. companies to lay-off workers and
close plants due to Mexico's lower labor costs. 72 Conversely,
NAFTA's principal supporters, namely government and big
business, 73 conceded that difficult societal shifts were likely to
occur due to economic realities, but contended that Americans
have historically thrived on innovation and challenge.7 4 Their
position encompassed the idea that economic growth forces soci-
etal change, which in turn, necessitates employee, family, and
government acceptance.
During the NAFTA debate, many decision-makers asked
their constituents to comment on the various aspects of the
agreement. 75 Leaders called on individuals and groups to deter-
mine how each segment believed the agreement would affect
them. For instance, the Advisory Committee for Trade Policy
and Negotiations, a group of business and organizational repre-
sentatives, was called upon to provide Congress with a summary
of and opinion on the agreement. 76
With the advantages and disadvantages of the pact out-
lined, Congress, under the fast-track process,77 was able to
make a fully informed decision. By being consulted in an open
system of government, the public's check was fully utilized.
With a better understanding of the role which public participa-
tion plays in international trade agreements, the question be-
MICHAEL WALKER, ASSESSING NAFTA: A TRINATIONAL ANALYSIS ix (1992). The
United States Congress enacted NAFTA in November, 1993, after significant
public scrutiny.
71. See generally Bob Davis, The New Demon: In Debate Over Nafta, Many
See Global Trade As Symbol of Hardship, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 1993, at Al, A5
(discussing the public's perception of the NAFTA agreement).
72. See Jill Dutt, Trading Opinions: Making Sense of the Hype Over
NAFTA, NEWSDAY, Nov. 7, 1993, at 5.
73. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
74. See Merck Chairman Calls on U.S. Congress to Approve NAFTA, Bus.
Wire, Oct. 20, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Bwire File.
75. See James Gerstenzang, Clinton Maps an Uphill Battle for Trade Pact,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1993, at Al.
76. Congress relied upon the Committee's position when deciding whether
to support NAFTA. Their Committee vote on NAFTA was unanimous, with the
exception of the AFL-CIO representative. See International Trade: Private Sec-
tor Panel Begins Work Advising Congress on GATT Agreement, Daily Report for
Executives (BNA), Dec. 20, 1993, at 242, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Drexec File.
77. 19 U.S.C. § 2191 (1988 & Supp. 1990). Congress reasserted itself with
regard to trade agreements through the Trade Act of 1974 and various amend-
ments which have created the current fast-track procedure. See supra note 51.
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comes not whether public participation is important, but rather
which methods of public participation best meet the conflicting
needs of both government and its citizens.
III. CURRENT PUBLIC PARTICIPATION APPROACHES
Public involvement in international trade negotiations has
become increasingly important as global markets become more
closely intertwined.7 Through open discussions of trade agree-
ments like NAFTA, the public has become more aware that in-
ternational economic issues are important to future domestic
prosperity.79 Taxing and spending policies, long seen as cata-
lysts of public interest in government, are now joined by interna-
tional economic issues such as tariffs, dumping, and trade
deficits.80 With increasing opportunities for public participa-
tion, this awareness has given the public the incentive to influ-
ence government leaders on international economic issues by
participating in the trade agreement negotiation process.
The public participates in trade negotiations in several
ways. Individuals influence governmental action by electing the
president and members of Congress, 8 ' joining special interest
groups which lobby influential members of the executive and
78. See supra note 50. From the mid 1970s through the 1980s, the Gallup
Poll found that individual economic prosperity was the most important issue
facing Americans. STANLEY & NIEMI, supra note 11, at 165.
79. In the late 1980s a sharp rise in the importance of foreign issues oc-
curred. Those selecting a foreign issue as the most important problem facing
the United States rose from less than 5% to more than 35%. Id. at 164. Also, in
the late 1980s, only 20% of the population saw the economy as the most impor-
tant issue facing the United States, while in 1993, the economy was chosen by
nearly 60%. Id. at 165.
80. Issues surrounding the domestic economy dominate reasons for public
interest in government. STANLEY & NIEMI, supra note 11, at 164-65. Consumer
confidence has long been an indicator of the public's happiness with govern-,
ment activities. It is measured by looking at the Index of Current Economic
Conditions and the Index of Consumer Expectations prepared by the Institute
for Social Research at the University of Michigan. Id. at 434-35. These indexes
are a compilation of questions such as: are you better off or worse off now than
you were last year, is it a good time to purchase major household items, and
where do you think you will be financially a year from now? Id. The index was
at a low point during the 1970s, reflecting the idea that people were upset about
government policies and how they affected their future. As a result, activism
increased. Id.
For nearly 40 years the Gallup Poll has asked Americans what they think
is the most important problem facing the country today. Id. at 164. Between
1950 and the 1970s the importance of domestic and foreign issues were about
equal. Id. Beginning in the 1970s, the most important issues facing Americans
became the domestic economy. Id. at 164-65.
81. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
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legislative branches, 82 initiating litigation,8 3 serving on pre-
sidentially appointed advisory committees,8 4 testifying at inter-
national trade commission hearings, 5  and protesting
individually or as a group.86 Ultimately, however, the degree of
public involvement in any area of government policy depends on
the amount of available access.87
Public access to the international trade agreement process
has been continually expanding over the past few years.88 Indi-
viduals are now allowed to help shape future agreements, rather
than simply being left to point out failures in already existing
agreements.8 9 In reemphasizing the open government mental-
ity of the 1970s, the 1990s have marked the beginning of a new
82. See John Harwood & Jackie Calmes, Freshman House Democrats Feel
Special Bind as Labor Applies Pressure for Anti-NAFTA Votes, WALL ST. J., Oct.
25, 1993, at A20.
83. See Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 822 F.Supp.
21 (D.D.C. 1993), rev'd, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993), and cert. denied, 114 S.Ct.
685 (1994). In Public Citizen, a public interest group challenged the NAFTA
negotiation and ratification process. It charged that, under the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act (NEPA), an environmental impact statement must be pre-
pared and submitted with the proposed treaty to Congress. While it did not
occur in this case, a judicial ruling in Public Citizen's favor would have held up
the passage of NAFTA beyond the period available for ratification and imple-
mentation. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
84. See 19 U.S.C. § 2155.
85. See, e.g., Trade Commission Plans Public Hearings on NAFTA, J. COM.,
Oct. 29, 1992, at A4.
86. See, e.g., Merck Chairman Calls on U.S. Congress to Approve NAFTA,
supra note 74.
87. Access is gained to the institutions of public policy formation in many
different ways, from affirmative rights granted by legislation, like the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988), to public rights not prohibited by
law, like a public demonstration. When an avenue of access is identified, the
public may legally assert itself in the hope of changing government policy. See
CONWAY, supra note 27, at 3-6.
88. Most expansion has occurred due to pressure applied by individuals de-
manding to be heard on specific issues. Interestingly, three major acts provid-
ing access to government actually restrict public access to the international
trade process. Sections 552-54 of the Administrative Procedure Act exempt for-
eign affairs functions from the Act's rule-making procedures, adjudicatory pro-
cedures, and its information-supplying requirements. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552-54. The
Freedom of Information Act exempts foreign policy issues that are specifically
authorized by Executive Order to be kept secret. Id. § 552b(c)(1)(A). The Fed-
eral Advisory Committee Act was only partially incorporated into the Trade Act
of 1974. Provisions for closed meetings were added to assure secrecy. 5 U.S.C.
app. § 10(a)(2)(d) (1988).
89. For example, in NAFTA, the Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and
Negotiations played a critical role in briefing Congress on the provisions of the
pact. The ACTPN is a group of approximately 40 leaders representing a cross-
section of American industry and labor. See supra note 76.
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era in trade negotiations. 90 Private individuals now play an im-
portant role in many areas throughout the international trade
agreement process. 9 1
Participation methods in international trade negotiations
may be analyzed by creating four categories using two participa-
tion characteristics: formal or informal, and direct or indirect.
Formal participation techniques are established by law as a way
for the public to influence governmental action.9 2 Examples are
found in the Constitution, federal statutes, and administrative
regulations. 9 3 Informal participation techniques are those that
are not established by law.94 This approach is often displayed
by individuals maneuvering outside the established legal regime
to force those inside government to consider a particular view or
position. 95
Direct participation techniques are those that place individ-
uals in contact with the actual representatives negotiating the
treaties or influencing the laws without the use of an intermedi-
ary or third party.96 Indirect participation techniques are those
which use intermediaries to advocate a particular position or in-
fluence the creation of legislation or agreement-making pro-
cess. 97 This method provides participants with less control over
the impact of their advocacy, as they seek to influence the nego-
tiation process from the outside.
Each method of public participation may be classified under
one of four public participation variations. These variations,
whether formal-direct, formal-indirect, informal-direct, or infor-
mal-indirect, possess distinctive characteristics which allow for
different levels of access and impact in the trade negotiation pro-
cess. The government ultimately plays the decisive role in pro-
moting or restricting public involvement by deciding which
variations are available to the public through the regulation of
the formality and directness of participation. Since each method
90. See supra notes 49-50, 52.
91. See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
92. See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 6, 44. Examples include the power to vote provided for
in the Constitution, advisory committees established under U.S. law, 19 U.S.C.
§ 2155, and public hearing procedures and requirements created by administra-
tive regulation, 5 U.S.C. § 553.
94. See infra note 112 (discussing the role and influence of political action
committees).
95. See infra note 112.
96. For examples of direct methods of public participation, see infra notes
98-99.
97. See infra note 113.
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of public participation has a distinctly different impact on the
trade negotiation process, it is important to discuss them each in
turn.
A. FoRMAL-DIRECT METHODS OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
Public participation methods which are both formally estab-
lished and allow for direct involvement are typically the most
effective way for the public to influence the trade negotiation
process. Through formal-direct methods, individuals work
within the established government system to influence trade
agreements. Formal methods of public involvement require leg-
islative or regulatory establishment; direct methods of public
participation entail actual contact between those seeking to im-
pact the process and the government representatives negotiat-
ing the agreement. The two primary examples of formal-direct
public participation are federal advisory committees 98 and pub-
lic hearings. 99
The Trade Act of 1974 established a system of federal advi-
sory committees to provide a communication link between the
public and the executive branch of government.10 0 Committees
made up of persons from the private and non-governmental pub-
lic sectors are typically consulted on negotiating objectives and
98. Advisory committees are good examples of formal-direct methods of
public participation because typically, these committees are formally estab-
lished by law and have a direct impact over the negotiation and implementation
of the trade agreement. The best example of a trade policy advisory committee
is the ACTPN. See infra note 102. ACTPN, under 19 U.S.C. § 2155, is called
upon to provide wide-ranging advice and information to the president, agencies,
departments, and Congress. See supra note 47. This kind of immediate impact
on the trade process makes the ACTPN a powerful force in the trade process.
See supra note 76.
99. Public hearings provide an example of the formal-direct method of pub-
lic participation because individuals or groups participating in the hearing typi-
cally act under formally established law and have a direct impact over the
negotiation and implementation of the trade agreement. The best example of
statutory trade policy public involvement is contained in the Trade Act of 1974.
19 U.S.C. § 2155 states, in general, that the president must seek information
and advice from representative elements of the private and non-federal govern-
ment sector regarding negotiating objectives and bargaining positions before
entering into a trade agreement, and the operation of any trade agreement once
entered into. 19 U.S.C. § 2155(a). The president may call upon the ACTPN to
provide advice, a special advisory committee may be formed, or public hearings
may be conducted by relevant agencies. 19 U.S.C. § 2155. Oftentimes, both
advisory committees and public hearings are utilized when considering the
same agreement. General public hearing requirements may be found in the
Administrative Procedure Act rulemaking process, 5 U.S.C. § 553.
100. 19 U.S.C. § 2155.
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bargaining positions, the operation of a trade agreement once
entered into, and other issues pertaining to the development,
implementation, and administration of United States trade pol-
icy. 10 1 These committees have no statutory authority to con-
clude agreements or alter the trade process. Their role is simply
to advise the president and agency leaders on international
trade issues.
Specifically, the 1974 Act required that the president estab-
lish the Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations
(ACTPN).10 2 This committee, composed of not more than forty-
five members covering broad sectors and groups of the economy,
is coordinated by the Office of the United States Trade Repre-
sentative. 10 3 Individuals appointed to this committee have a
unique opportunity to directly influence the goals, emphasis,
and reach of foreign trade agreements. For example, in Decem-
ber of 1993, the ACTPN was instructed to submit to Congress
their preliminary assessments of the Uruguay Round GATT
agreement.' 0 4 Its members, representing key sectors of the U.S.
economy affected by international trade, 10 5 were personally
briefed by U.S. trade negotiators on the advantages and disad-
101. 19 U.S.C. § 2155(a).
102. 19 U.S.C. § 2155(b). ACTPN, as set up under the Trade Act of 1974,
has a team of staffpersons led by the director of the Office of Private Sector
Liaison, which is housed in the Office of the United Stated Trade Representa-
tive. The 'Committee advises, consults with, and makes recommendations to
the President of the United States, the U.S. Congress, and the U.S. Trade Rep-
resentative with respect to the operation of trade agreements entered into by
the United States and with respect to other matters arising in connection with
the administration of the trade policy of the United States." ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
GOVERNMENTAL ADVISORY ORGANIZATIONS § 714 (Donna Batten ed., 9th ed.
1993).
103. Id. The president is also authorized to establish any other general pol-
icy or sectoral or functional advisory committees as needed. 19 U.S.C.
§ 2155(c).
104. See supra note 76. The Uruguay Round is an attempt to improve the
existing General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) rules governing trade
in goods and to extend the coverage of GAIT regulations to international trade
in services, trade in farm products, intellectual property protection, and trade-
related investment issues. THoMAs R. HOWELL ET AL., CONFLICT AMONG NA-
TIONS: TRADE POLICIES IN THE 1990s 2 (1992).
105. The ACTPN is dominated by representatives of multinational corpora-
tions. The chief executive officers of companies like AT&T, Motorola, Caterpil-
lar, Philip Morris, Boeing, Merck, and Phillips Petroleum make up the majority
of the board. There are, however, representatives from other sectors of interest
including the director of the World Wildlife Fund, AFL-CIO, and Consumers for
World Trade. See International Trade: Private Sector Panel Begins Work Ad-
vising Congress on GATT Agreement, supra note 76.
1995]
MINN J GLOBAL TRADE
vantages of the agreement. 106 Many commentators agree that
although Congress has "the final word on the [GATT] agree-
ment,... the opinion of industry and other private sector inter-
ests, as represented by the private sector advisory committees,
will clearly count enormously in the final analysis.' u0 7
Both Congress and the International Trade Commission
provide additional opportunities for individuals and representa-
tives of interested groups to participate in the trade process
through public hearings. Congress often provides public notice
of international agreements. ' 0 8 As a result, agencies involved in
foreign trade normally conduct public hearings prior to imple-
mentation or passage of an agreement. 109 At these hearings, in-
terested and affected members of the public, private enterprise,
and government testify before congressional or administrative
committees.
Public hearings also provide access to the negotiation pro-
cess for individuals not associated with a presidentially ap-
pointed advisory committee. Individuals participating in public
hearings on trade policy issues serve an important role in open-
ing up the trade agreement process and providing those in
power with important information. Public hearings thus serve a
dual role. First, they help connect the public with those prepar-
ing to make important trade-related decisions, and second, they
provide government officials with the information they need to
make those decisions.
Formal-direct methods of public participation provide indi-
viduals with an established mechanism through which they can
personally affect the trade negotiation process. These methods
provide a level of intimacy and legitimacy lacking in other forms
of public participation. As a result, formal-direct methods of
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. When Congress considers a bill or piece of legislation, it typically as-
signs it to a committee to be thoroughly evaluated. As a representative body of
delegates, Congress demands input from various elements of its constituent
base prior to deciding a matter. That input is usually provided at the commit-
tee level through public hearings. WILLIAM J. KEEFE & MORRIS S. OGUL, THE
AMERICAN LEGISLATrvE PROCESS: CONGRESS AND THE STATES 270-75 (6th ed.
1985). Typically, notices of public hearings are published in the Federal Regis-
ter about two months in advance of the hearing date. Those notices are picked
up by various news services and disseminated further into society. For exam-
ple, the Bureau of National Affairs, International Trade Reporter, regularly
publishes public hearing announcements including the time, date, and place of
the hearing. See, e.g., Trade Commission Plans Public Hearings on NAFTA, 10
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1860 (Nov. 3, 1993).
109. See id.
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public participation provide the public with a superior opportu-
nity to influence international trade.
B. FORMAL-INDIRECT METHODS OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
Formally established methods of public participation, which
do not allow for direct involvement, are the most common ap-
proach used to impact the international trade process. Through
this approach, private individuals and groups work with and
through government officials to directly impact the trade negoti-
ation and implementation process. Special interest groups use
these methods effectively when seeking to influence trade nego-
tiations. Formal methods of public participation require legisla-
tive or regulatory establishment, while indirect methods of
public participation involve lobbying leaders and policy makers
to eventually influence those persons actually negotiating the
agreement. Two primary examples of this method of public par-
ticipation are the election of public leaders and utilization of the
court system. 110
Electing representatives to serve in government is the most
obvious method of public participation.11 As a result of plural-
ism and special interests, increasing numbers of individuals and
groups select or endorse candidates for public service based on
specific issues.'1 2 As public interest in the area of international
110. Although only a small minority of individuals decide who to vote for, or
initiate litigation, based on international trade issues, these avenues for partic-
ipation are available and widely utilized. In 1992, 61% of the voting age popu-
lation reported that they had voted in the presidential election. STANLEY &
NIEMI, supra note 11, at 88. Individuals like Ross Perot have vowed to use the
popular vote as a weapon against those he feels are not serving the interest of
the American people. See William Schneider, Is the Two-Party System Near its
End?, NAT'L J., Jan. 8, 1994, at 98.
111. See STANLEY & NIEMI, supra note 11, at 88 (percent of Americans vot-
ing in the last election). The president is the most important elected official
controlled by the elective process. However, members of Congress are also im-
portant for they decide whether to reauthorize the Trade Acts. Additionally,
senators confirm presidential appointees that dominate the American foreign
trade apparatus, and play a direct role when deciding the fate of trade agree-
ments under the fast-track or advice and consent procedures. 19 U.S.C. § 2191.
112. Political action committees (PACs), which advocate special interests
above all else, have increased in total number from- 608 registered PACs in
1974, to 4195 registered PACs in 1992. STANLEY & NIEMI, supra note 11, at
175. They have increased their annual contributions to congressional candi-
dates from $22.6 million in 1975-76, to $178.4 million in 1991-92. Id. at 178.
These groups advocate direct political action in the form of political funds and
assistance in campaigns. Since parties or candidates rarely judge their cam-
paign resources to be adequate, they find it difficult to ignore an open treasury.
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trade increases, voters will likely consider trade policy as an in-
creasingly important election criterion. 113
The power of the vote controls elected officials and thereby
indirectly influences the goals, emphasis, and reach of foreign
trade agreements. 114 During the NAFTA debates in Congress,
for example, President Clinton watched public approval ratings
with great interest. 11 5 Richard Gephardt, former majority
leader of the U.S. House of Representatives, stated that
"[p]eople have really tuned in to this" and that they seem to care
more deeply about this issue than any other of his political ca-
reer.116 The relationship between public opinion and election
results can thus have a serious impact on international trade
agreements.
The courts have also become an increasingly important tool
for influencing the trade negotiation process. The court system
has traditionally been viewed as a last resort for organizations
wishing to resist activities which they feel are detrimental to
their special interests. 117 However, by initiating litigation, a
small, unknown organization gains, along with an opportunity
This, in turn, gives PACs a great deal of influence with and access to legislators.
KEEFE & OGUL, supra note 108, at 277-81.
113. The NAFTA debate raised awareness of the importance of interna-
tional trade to overall quality of life and well-being, and will raise the impor-
tance of trade in the minds of most Americans. See Charles Lewis, supra note
52, at C1. In fact, studies have concluded that NAFTA will lead to the loss of
between 290,000 and 490,000 U.S. jobs over 10 years as a result of the diversion
of investment from the United States to Mexico. GLOBERMAN & WALKER, supra
note 70, at 22, (citing Jeff Faux & Thea Lee, The Effect of George Bush's NAFTA
on American Workers: Ladder Up or Ladder Down, ECON. POL'Y INST. (1992)).
The publicity of such data demonstrates to the general public that trade agree-
ments can powerfully impact their lives.
114. Elected officials are fully aware of the power the people have over their
future. During the NAFTA debate on the floor of the House of Representatives,
Rep. Gerry Solomon (R-NY), speaking for many elected leaders stated, "the
American people don't care whether you're Republicans or Democrats, they are
going to throw your butts out of here if you don't turn around and stop taxing
and spending and regulating on the American people." The Big Story 8:30 a.m.
ET, The Trade Battle, Nov. 20, 1993, transcript #70 (CNN), available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Curnws File.
115. See Bruce Stokes, A Hard Sell, 25 NAT'L J. 2472 (Oct. 16, 1993).
116. See Dutt, supra note 72.
117. One organization utilizing the court system as its dominant means of
influence is the American Civil Liberties Union. See SAMUEL WALKER, IN DE-
FENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HIsToRY OF THE ACLU (1990). Through the
use of the court system, the ACLU, founded in 1920, has helped create a sub-
stantial body of law in all the major areas of civil rights, including: freedom of
speech and press, separation of church and state, free exercise of religion, due
process of law, equal protection, and privacy. Id. at 3.
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to be heard, instant access to those with the power to influence
the trade process. While a favorable ruling is certainly the goal,
if the case is significant or timely, even a dismissal or unfavora-
ble ruling can be viewed as a success. 118 The media attention
alone may help place the issue in the minds of the public and its
leaders. That, in turn, may spur renewed debate on the issue,
possibly in a different and more sympathetic light. It is this op-
portunity that makes legal action an effective technique for in-
fluencing foreign trade agreements.
Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative,119
which involved NAFTA environmental impact statements, ex-
emplifies the impact which legal action can have on interna-
tional trade. The plaintiffs in Public Citizen argued that the
Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) was an
agency subject to the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), and therefore, NEPA required the USTR to submit
NAFTA to Congress with an accompanying environmental im-
pact statement (EIS).' 20 Ultimately, the court held that an EIS
was not required, as the USTR was merely making a recommen-
dation to Congress rather than promulgating a rule.' 2 '
If successful, Public Citizen could have delayed NAFTA for
many months while the EIS was prepared. That delay, in turn,
would have pushed the agreement beyond the time limits estab-
lished by Congress under fast-track, leading to the immediate
failure of the pact. 122 Thus, Public Citizen demonstrates that
118. In seeking to force an environmental impact statement on the provi-
sions of NAFTA, the plaintiffs in Public Citizen v. United States Trade Repre-
sentative looked beyond the particulars of their case. Public Citizen v. United
States Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993). "We would like to get
a ruling that will shape trade policy-making in the future," with the hope that
an environmental impact statement will be performed before a trade deal is
presented to Congress. Appeals Court Overturns Decision Calling for NAFTA
Impact Statement, Banking Report (BNA), Oct. 4, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, News File.
119. 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
120. See id. However, in drafting NEPA, Congress did not create a private
right of action. Public Citizen was thus forced to base its claim on the APA. Id.
The APA provides citizens with a right to challenge final agency actions. 5
U.S.C. § 702 (1988). The Court of Appeals ultimately found that no final agency
action could be found. 5 F.3d at 553. The Court also found that NAFTA was
not proposed by an agency but by the president. The president is not an agency
and is not covered under the EIS provisions of the NEPA. Therefore, the presi-
dent's action in submitting an international trade agreement to Congress did
not constitute "final agency action" reviewable under the APA. Id.
121. Id.
122. Fast-track places time limits on the passage of trade agreements. 19
U.S.C. § 2903.
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taking action through the court system may provide public in-
terest groups with a powerful, formal, yet indirect method of af-
fecting international trade agreements.
C. INFORMAL-DIRECT METHODS OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
Informally established methods of public participation,
which allow direct involvement, offer opportunities for signifi-
cant impact but are quite difficult to utilize. It is more appropri-
ate to consider these methods as quasi-public participation, as
only a select group of individuals and organizations are called
upon to participate. When accessible, however, these methods
are an effective way to influence the trade negotiation process.
Through this method, individuals work closely with government
officials, creating or influencing trade agreements. The primary,
and possibly only, example of informal-direct public participa-
tion is when a private citizen or group is called upon to serve as
a special resource to the negotiating or implementing govern-
ment group.
For example, the president has delegated power to the
USTR 123 to solicit and recruit various private individuals to
lobby, provide information, or even negotiate trade agreements
on behalf of the U.S. government. The USTR holds a central
position in all trade agreement issues, reporting to both Con-
gress and the president, and serving "as the principle
spokes[person] of the president on international trade."124 Most
importantly, "[t]he United States Trade Representative may
delegate any of his [or her] functions, powers, and duties to such
officers and employees of the Office as he [or she] may desig-
nate."125 That provision authorizes the USTR to select private
individuals to advise the executive and Congress on interna-
tional trade issues.
Serving as a special resource for a negotiation group can
place a non-elected person in the middle of the policy-making
process. The USTR often calls upon chief executive officers of
123. Congress delegated power to the president to "seek information and ad-
vice from representative elements of the private sector and the non-Federal
governmental sector." 19 U.S.C. § 2155(a)(1). The Office of the United States
Trade Representative was created as the Office of the Special Representative
for Trade Negotiations by Exec. Order No. 11,075, 3 C.F.R. 652 (1959-63), re-
printed in 76 Stat. 872, on January 15, 1963. The Trade Act of 1974 established
the Office as an agency of the Executive Office of the President charged with
administering the various trade agreement programs. See 19 U.S.C. § 2171.
124. See id § (c)(1)(E-G).
125. See id § (c)(3)(A).
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major corporations to provide information or expertise to gov-
ernment negotiators. Academics and members of private sector
think-tanks are also invited to assist in policy formulation, or to
provide information on a specific area or issue. 12 6 These individ-
uals can contribute in many ways, including serving for a lim-
ited time on the staff of one of the agencies.127 Not surprisingly,
such intimate involvement of a person or group allows this infor-
mal-direct method of public participation to be extremely effec-
tive. However, instances of informal-direct public participation
are quite rare.
D. INFORMAL-INDIRECT METHODS OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
Public participation methods which are both informal and
indirect are the fastest growing technique for the public to influ-
ence the trade negotiation process.' 28 Through this method, in-
dividuals work outside the established system to influence the
trade agreement negotiation and implementation process. In-
formal public participation adheres to few rules, and indirect
public participation requires creativity and perseverance to at-
tain the level of effectiveness necessary to actually impact those
negotiating the trade agreements. The primary examples of in-
formal-indirect public participation are lobbying and public pro-
test, by both individuals and groups.
126. During the NAFTA debate, the Clinton Administration elicited the
assistance of three former presidents and 300 economists, including twelve
Nobel laureates. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Side
Agreements, Hearing of the House Ways and Means Committee, FED. NEWS SER-
VICE, Sept. 14, 1993 (statement of Mickey Kantor, U.S. Trade Representative)
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File.
127. For instance, Former Congressman Bill Frenzel (R-MN) was called
from his duties as a guest scholar with the Brookings Institution to serve as a
Special Advisor to the President on NAFTA throughout the trade agreement's
journey through Congress. See Grocery Manufacturers of America, Inc. (GMA)
Press Conference, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 9, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Curnws File. Additionally, the Clinton Administration assisted in the
formation of USA*NAFTA, a coalition of 2700 businesses and trade associations
widely recognized as the nation's principle business lobby supporting NAFTA.
T.R. Goldman, USA*NAFTA, Finding First Gear; Leadership Woes, Wait-and-
See Stance Leave Business Groups Playing Catch-Up in Trade Fight, LEGAL
TIMES, Sept. 20, 1993, at 1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File.
The group set out to raise approximately $7.0 million to wage a national media
campaign in favor of the pact. Id.
128. Informal and indirect participation is what makes up the Perot revolu-
tion, giving ordinary individuals a voice and influence over the processes of gov-
ernment. See H. Ross PEROT, UNITED WE STAND: How WE CAN TAKE BACK OUR
CoUNTRY (1992).
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Special interest groups have become an increasingly impor-
tant and influential component of the government process. 129
Ordinarily, these groups advocate a specific set of interrelated
issues to both the public and government. They obtain support
and strength through the depth and breadth of their member-
ship. In order to effectively influence government, these groups
attempt to demonstrate to government leaders that they hold
the key to their political future.' 3 0 Accordingly, this public con-
stituency, whether through formal-direct methods like voting, or
informal-indirect methods like campaign contributions, carries
enormous weight. 131
Non-governmental organizations, 3 2 like special interest
groups, spend a great deal of their time and resources lobbying
members of Congress and the executive to influence issues in
their favor. Non-governmental organizations have become a
major force in domestic politics and have become actively in-
volved in global environmental issues.133 The strength of their
views, however, may lead to deadlock and an inability to com-
promise and identify workable solutions.' 34 Overall, lobbying by
special interest groups is a way for individuals to unify their
message for maximum impact, 35 but their effect may be
debilitative.
During the NAFTA debate, representatives of organized la-
bor, including the AFL-CIO, pressured members of Congress to
129. See supra note 112 (discussing the number and influence of interest
groups).
130. See DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 304-14, 502-16
(1951).
131. See INTEREST GROUP POLiIcs 205-12 (Allan J. Cigher & Burdett A.
Loomis eds., 3rd ed. 1991).
132. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is a term used to describe
large special interest groups that are not directly controlled by the government
under which they operate. Examples of NGOs are found on the local, state,
federal, and international levels and include organizations such as Greenpeace,
the United Way, the Red Cross, and Amnesty International. See LOWELL LIVE-
ZEY, NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE IDEAS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
(1988).
133. See Bruce Stokes, Greens Talk Trade, NAT'L J., Apr. 13, 1991, at 862.
134. See THEODORE J. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM (2d ed. 1979).
135. Individuals, as well as organizations, may utilize lobbying as a means
of public intervention. As public and private constituencies realize the sheer
power of the media, they increasingly seek access to sources of mass communi-
cation. See generally CONWAY, supra note 27, at 81-92. Advocates like Ross
Perot, for example, have raised public awareness through the creative use of
the media. See Dutt, supra note 72, at 5.
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vote against the pact. 136 Union leaders threatened their elected
officials with the potential loss of campaign contributions and
votes. 137 Even if a congressperson does not need union-related
votes, many cannot afford to lose the financial support.138
Clearly, lobbying becomes much more effective when an elected
official is dependent on the financial or popular support of the
lobbyist.
The second primary example of informal-indirect public par-
ticipation is public protest. Forms of public protest, like constit-
uent letter writing or calling government officials, carry great
potential influence when done en masse.'39 Individuals, through
use of the mail, telephone, and media, are able to get involved
immediately, affecting public opinion and the position of their
elected and appointed representatives. Given that national or-
ganizations conduct public opinion surveys on nearly a daily ba-
sis, political leaders adjust positions and arguments accordingly.
Conveying public dissatisfaction to those responsible for crafting
a remedy helps address and ultimately resolve problems.
However, the public must have access to information in or-
der to form an opinion and convey it to those in power.' 40 The
public notice requirements in the 1974 Act, the Freedom of In-
formation Act,' 4 ' and the remainder of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act,' 42 all assist the public in obtaining the information
it needs. The Freedom of Information Act requires agencies of
the federal government to make available to the public large
amounts of information on the activities, procedures, internal
rules, and opinions of each agency.' 4 3 The Administrative Pro-
cedure Act as a whole also requires agencies to give the public
notice and an opportunity to comment regarding the actions and
policies of those agencies.' 44 While individually limited, collec-
tively, these public involvement tools provide access to the infor-
136. John Harwood & Jackie Calmes, Freshman House Democrats Feel Spe-
cial Bind As Labor Applies Pressure for Anti-NAFTA Votes, WALL ST. J., Oct.
25, 1993, at A20.
137. Id.
138. During the 1991-92 election period, veteran Democrats received 31% of
their political action committee contributions from labor union political action
committees. Id.
139. See PEROT, supra note 128.
140. See TRUMAN, supra note 130.
141. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
142. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
143. 5 U.S.C. 552(a).
144. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c).
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mation which is required to fully understand and comment on
government policy.
Overall, unrestricted informal-indirect public participation
disrupts the international trade negotiation process more than
any other method of public involvement. 145 Public opinion
forces government negotiators to open the door to delicate dis-
cussions that require strict confidentiality and trust in order to
succeed. As a result, the fast-track procedure and other meth-
ods of balancing the desires of the public and the needs of negoti-
ators are positive steps toward increasing beneficial public
participation.
IV. LIKELY EVOLUTION AND PROPOSALS FOR
CHANGE
Trade agreements are unique international legal instru-
ments. They are hybrids of legal and political systems that re-
quire a delicate balance between competing forces. 146 In many
ways trade agreements may be viewed as both legislation and
contracts. 147 The inherent conflict in trade agreements lies in
the basic idea that legislation requires a different environment
and formulation process than does a contract.148 This conflict is
likely to shape the future of public participation in U.S. trade
policy.
145. Individuals and groups create this disharmony by placing pressure on
their leaders. See supra note 112.
146. Professors Jackson and Davey describe this dilemma as one where:
[T]here appears to be a need to limit or circumscribe the very extensive
authority that has grown up in the Executive Branch over interna-
tional economic affairs; on the other hand, it is not clear that the
United States will be able to bargain effectively in international eco-
nomic negotiations if such limitations are imposed. The Executive
Branch appears to be the only viable agent for such negotiations, and
the feebler is its power, the less effective will be its negotiating ability,
unless it can somehow persuade its trading partners that Congress is
prepared to deliver on those commitments that require congressional
action.
JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 17, at 78.
147. The power to regulate foreign commerce is vested in Congress. See
supra note 3. Congress, as a legislative body, conducts its business in public via
the introduction and passage of legislation. The power to make treaties is
shared by the executive and legislative branches. See supra note 4. Thus, the
president negotiates contracts with other countries, and the president is re-
sponsible for their terms and ensuring that they are faithfully executed. See
supra note 5.
148. See infra notes 150-51.
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A. THE LEGISLATION/CONTRACT PARADOX
The legislative process in a democracy demands an open
structure. Elected officials debate in an environment where
each person has an opportunity to influence the process through
contacting his or her legislators or possibly testifying at a hear-
ing. Public input is crucial to the legislative process because the
results of the law-making enterprise establish policy for the en-
tire nation. 14 9
Conversely, the delicate atmosphere surrounding most com-
plex contract negotiations requires a closed structure. Contracts
represent compromises between two divergent positions initially
advocated by the contracting parties. 150 Throughout the negoti-
ation process, the parties propose terms to which the opposing
side may or may not agree. Ultimately, only those ideas agreed
upon are incorporated into the contract.
Treating trade agreements as either contracts or legislation
causes negotiation and implementation difficulties. Allowing
third party involvement and openness throughout the fragile ne-
gotiation process leads to mistrust and a lack of confidence. 151
Even worse, the parties may never find a workable middle
ground if all aspects of the agreement become open to public
scrutiny during the process of negotiation. 5 2
Indirect methods of public participation create situations
where it is virtually impossible to maintain the requisite level of
confidentiality. Generally, an overabundance of public partici-
pation through activities such as lobbying and public protest has
contributed to the federal government's lethargic pace and inef-
fectiveness.153 Most criticism focuses on special interest groups
which often apply extensive pressure, thereby causing federal
government inaction. 54 Such intense public involvement can
149. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
150. See Gary T. Lowenthal, A General Theory of Negotiation Process, Strat-
egy, and Behavior, 31 U. KAN. L. REV. 69 (1982).
151. In international trade relationships concerning the United States, the
problem centers around Congress, as the third party, and whether the execu-
tive has the appropriate "negotiation credibility" to induce foreign nations to
bargain. See JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 17, at 113.
152. See LARKIN, supra note 12, at 65-69.
153. See Dutt, supra note 72. The corruption of modern democratic govern-
ment began with the emergence of interest-group liberalism as the public phi-
losophy. Too many interest groups and individuals involved in the political
process deranges and confuses expectations about democratic institutions,
keeps governments from planning, denies justice, and allows for corruption. Id.
154. Id.
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keep government leaders from acting in the best interest of
American citizens.
Mass public involvement in government is typically not de-
structive in its own right. It is only destructive when what is
sought is absolutely unable to be compromised. 155 The differ-
ence between mass public participation paralyzing government
and mass public participation inspiring change in government is
in the spirit and mission of the special interest groups. Those
groups seeking to join with government to change things in the
overall national interest make a positive contribution to society.
On the other hand, those seeking to halt government progress in
any way possible, relentless in their effort to get exactly what
they desire and unwilling to sacrifice to move progressively
closer to their desired goal, contribute negatively. It is the prac-
tices of the latter group that call for reduced mass public partici-
pation in government. l5 6
The solution to the problem of increasing public involve-
ment without compromising the confidentiality of the negotia-
tion process lies with formal-direct public participation, such as
involvement by advisory committees. Increasing formal partici-
pation leads to legitimate and inclusive agreements. 57 This
progressive approach breaks down barriers between those who
are traditionally parties to trade negotiations and those who are
not. It also provides an orderly system within which to work.
Increasing direct participation leads to increased impact and
control by the general public, ultimately satisfying both the in-
formational needs of government and the oversight require-
ments of a democracy.' 58
People with direct access to the trade process are likely to be
better informed and more willing to work toward obtaining a
clear and complete view of the issue prior to making a recom-
mendation to the president or Congress.' 5 9 Increasing and pro-
155. Id.
156. See V.O. KEY JR., PUBLIC OPINION AND THE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 500,
524-31 (1961) (discussing private pressure groups and the extent to which they
are links between public opinion and government). Key concludes that pres-
sure group participation in government more often than not reflects highly lim-
ited participation by the active elements of these groups. Often, a very small
number of individuals both in government and in the private sphere create pub-
lic policy. Id.
157. See supra notes 98-99.
158. See Rabin, supra note 62.
159. Direct involvement in the trade agreement negotiation process gives a
select group of people the necessary access to stay highly informed on the issues
facing them. For example, U.S. negotiators fully brief the ACTPN before
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moting formal-direct public participation over informal-indirect
public participation leads to increased reconciliation of public
and governmental interests. Informal-indirect public participa-
tion seeks complete government openness. Formal-direct public
participation, however, creates public involvement opportunities
in a closed system. Simply put, the confidentiality needed in
trade agreement negotiation is joined with public input from the
people, satisfying the needs of both the government and the pub-
lic. 160 As a result, the needs of legislation will more completely
mesh with the requirements of contracts.
B. FAST-TRACK: AN EXAMPLE OF TRADE NEGOTIATION
EFFECTIVENESS
Although the current trade negotiation system is far from
ideal,161 some integrative ideas have recently surfaced in an at-
tempt to find an amicable compromise between divergent inter-
ests. One such idea is the fast-track process, 162 whereby the
president submits to Congress an agreement which Congress
must accept or reject "as is," requiring that the negotiated agree-
ment be left intact.163 This trade agreement negotiation and
ratification technique is a positive step toward limiting infor-
ACTPN's decision is made and sent to the executive and Congress. See 19
U.S.C. § 2155.
160. A representative democracy is open to the point where constituents are
reasonably informed as to how their elected leaders are using the power pro-
vided to them through the ballot box. See KEEFE & OGUL, supra note 108, at 54-
63.
161. Patti A. Goldman, an attorney with the Public Citizen Litigation
Group, stated that:
The trade system, both in terms of its international operations and the
way in which the United States participates in it, is at odds with [the]
principles of openness and access. Thus, the public is shut out of inter-
national trade negotiations by the secrecy that pervades the negotiat-
ing process. International trade negotiations are conducted in a far
more secret manner than international environmental negotiations,
where drafts and alternative positions are discussed openly, presuma-
bly because national leaders recognize that they need to mobilize sup-
port for environmental solutions and that publicity is one way to do so.
If the intersection between trade and the environment is resolved in
trade negotiations, the public will be kept in the dark until the result is
announced.
Patti A. Goldman, Resolving the Trade and Environment Debate: In Search of a
Neutral Forum and Neutral Principles, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1279, 1283
(1992).
162. See 19 U.S.C. § 2191. Fast-track legislation was initially enacted by
Pub. L. 93-618, 88 Stat. 2001, January 3, 1975.
163. Id.
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mal-indirect methods of participation, while promoting formal-
direct methods. 164
Nevertheless, during the NAFTA debates, the term fast-
track took on a pejorative connotation, leaving many citizens
feeling that they were shut out of the process. 165 Negative con-
gressional attitudes based on Congress' inability to politically
reshape the treaty, frustrated by fast-track's more efficient and
effective process, fueled public resentment. 166 Yet, through it
all, fast-track laid claim to an effective middle ground between
the requirements of legislative openness and contractual
confidence.
From a legislative perspective, the agreement was placed
"on the table" for all to scrutinize. As a trade agreement with
tax ramifications, NAFTA provided both the House and Senate
an opportunity to view the treaty.167 Congress, the media, and
the public were given several months to discuss and debate it.
From a contractual perspective, each negotiating country could
put its best offer forward knowing that Congress would not, and
could not, fatally reshape the agreement. The important power
of the negotiator to create a deal, effectively binding the nation,
was maintained. In a sense, fast-track forced Congress to dis-
pose of a great deal of political maneuvering to do what was best
for the United States as a whole. For the most part, fast-track
was a successful attempt at reducing the special interest politics
which often plague the federal government. 6
By increasing formal-direct public participation, the public
is allowed to play an important role without hindering the confi-
dentiality necessary to negotiate a contract effectively. Public
advisory committees, for example, serve as a check on the trade
164. Fast-track limits informal-indirect public participation by not allowing
amendments by Congress. 19 U.S.C. § 2191(d). The fast-track process supports
formal-direct public participation by creating an atmosphere where emphasis is
placed on the creation of the agreement, with its advisory committee and public
hearing inputs, rather than on the congressional ratification during which in-
formal-indirect public participation methods are influential.
165. See Davis, supra note 71.
166. Id.
167. Through fast-track, Congress considered NAFTA as a tax bill, which
requires the support of both houses, rather than as a treaty, which only re-
quires the advice and consent of the Senate. See supra note 4.
168. This ideal was diminished, however, by the many side agreements
President Clinton signed in order to secure the 218 votes needed for passage in
the House of Representatives. See Labor Side Agreement, 10 Int'l Trade Rep.(BNA) No. 42, at 1822 (Oct. 27, 1993); see also North American Free Trade
Agreement Side Accord on Environment, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at
1536 (Sept. 15, 1993).
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process and provide the executive and Congress with the infor-
mation and perspective needed to make informed judgments.
Also, members of the general public may participate in the pro-
cess through hearings conducted by Congress and administra-
tive agencies. While there may not be a perfect solution to the
conflicting demnands placed on the trade agreement process, fast-
track, with its simple yes or no vote, reduces the haggling, pork-
barreling, and log-rolling typically associated with important
political issues. Fast-track is an integrative idea which in-
creases constructive public participation without sacrificing the
confidentiality needed to negotiate a useful trade agreement.
As international relationships continue to play an increas-
ingly important role in the U.S. economy, the future of foreign
trade negotiations will require an open yet productive proce-
dure. Such a procedure, like fast-track, must provide ample op-
portunity for public input while allowing negotiators an
adequate level of confidentiality. When harmony between the
requirements of contract and legislation is achieved, everyone
will benefit.
V. CONCLUSION
During his presidency, Woodrow Wilson advocated "open
covenants openly arrived at."169 Not until recently, however,
has such an idea become a public priority. Although for most of
the 20th century international trade agreements were privately
negotiated by members of the executive branch, a critical shift
took place in the 1970s when government leaders began to em-
phasize trade along with world security issues.170 The resulting
increase in public participation serves as a check on government
power and provides information to decision-makers. While open
government is likely to remain a fixture in U.S. politics, it is im-
portant that only appropriate public participation measures be
crafted and supported. These measures should result in inter-
national trade agreements in the best interests of the United
States.
Formal-direct public participation is the most effective and
efficient way to allow the public access to trade negotiation
processes without sacrificing the confidentiality of the negotia-
tion strategy. Through increased use of presidentially appointed
advisory committees and public hearings, the public plays an
169. LEROY N. RIESELBACH, PEOPLE VS. GOVERNMENT 48 (1975).
170. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
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important role in setting the trade agenda and shaping discus-
sion. Such formal-direct methods of public participation
strengthen the government's ability to negotiate with its trading
partners in confidence and provide the power to carry out
promises made at the conference table. The use of fast-track
during the NAFTA process proved to be a successful way to do
just that. Fast-track's requirement of yes or no voting on the
agreement as a whole, without opportunity to amend, enabled
Congress to overcome much of the special interest influence and
partisan politics which has plagued many government initia-
tives. This maximizes the productive aspects of formal-direct
public participation while minimizing the debilitating effects of
informal-indirect public participation, leading to more effective
international trade agreements, thereby making-Woodrow Wil-
son's dream a reality.
